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Kasco Services Corporation ("Kasco") petitions the
Court under Rule 3 5, Utah R. App. P. , for a rehearing of the
Court's holding that prospective injunctive relief for Kasco
would be inappropriate and of little or no value.

Kasco does

not seek rehearing on any other issue.
I.

CERTIFICATION

Counsel for Kasco certify that this Petition is
presented in good faith and not for delay.
II.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This is an interlocutory appeal from the district
court's denial of injunctive relief against Larry D. Benson,
Connie Benson and Robert Benson.

Kasco commenced this action

for injunctive relief and damages based upon contractual
covenants against post-employment competition entered into by
Larry D. Benson.
On March 17, 1989, Kasco filed a verified complaint
against Larry Benson, his wife Connie Benson, and Tri-B-Supply,
seeking injunctive relief and damages (R. 2). On the same date,
the district court entered a temporary restraining order against
the defendants.

(R. 85). On March 21, 1989, following a

hearing, the district court granted a preliminary injunction
against Larry Benson.

(R. 126, R. 973, pp. 5-11).
-1-
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The district

court signed an order of preliminary injunction on April 10,
1989.

(R. 139). Subsequently, Kasco filed four motions:

(1)

Motion for Preliminary Injunction Against Connie Benson and
Order to Show Cause Why Connie Benson Should Not Be Held in
Contempt of Court, dated April 7, 1989 (R. 156); (2) Motion for
Leave to Amend Complaint (naming Robert Benson, Larry' s son, as
a defendant and modifying Kasco's claims), dated August 24,
1989, (R. 353); (3) Motion for Preliminary Injunction Against
Robert Benson, dated January 5, 1990, (R. 461); and (4) Motion
for Modification of the Court' s April 7, 1989, Order of
Preliminary Injunction, dated January 17, 1990.

(R. 846). The

district court denied Kasco' s motions without findings of fact
or conclusions of law.

(R. 942).

Kasco filed its Petition for Permission to Appeal
Interlocutory Order on May 29, 1990.

(R. 948). This Court

granted interlocutory appeal to Kasco on July 17, 1990, (R. 947)
and on August 14, 1990, it granted Kasco' s Motion for Injunction
Pending Disposition of Petition Under Rule 5 and Pending Appeal
filed on June 20, 1990.

(Addendum M).

On March 31, 1982, this

Court filed its decision which dissolved the injunction pending
appeal and remanded the case to the trial court for further

-2g:\wpl\188\00001cni.W51

proceedings including the determination of Kasco' s damages.

A

complete copy of the Court' s opinion is attached as Appendix A.
III.

ISSUE PRESENTED

Did the Court misapprehend the law and facts when it
concluded that prospective injunctive relief depends upon
preserving the status quo and that such relief would be of
little or no value to Kasco?
IV.
A.

ARGUMENT

Prospective Injunctive Relief Should Not Depend
Upon Whether The Status Quo Was Preserved

Kasco requested on appeal that Respondents Larry,
Connie and Robert Benson be enjoined prospectively for a total
of eighteen months.

(Kasco' s opening brief, p. 35; Kasco' s

Reply Brief, p. 25). Kasco did so to realize the benefit of its
employment agreement with Larry Benson.

The agreement allowed

Kasco eighteen months after Larry Benson' s termination to
consolidate and preserve its good will in the employee hired to
replace Mr. Benson.

(Kasco' s opening brief, p. 32; Addendum A

to Kasco's opening brief, 11 4.3).

The Court's March 31, 1992,

opinion ("Opinion") confirmed that the agreement's postemployment restriction is enforceable, not just as to Larry
Benson, but also as to Connie and possibly Robert Benson.
(Opinion pp. 2-8).
-3g \wpl\188\00001cnl W51

As the Court observed, either Larry Benson or Connie
and Robert Benson have remained in business throughout these
proceedings.

(Opinion p. 10). The Court also found ample legal

authority to provide Kasco prospective injunctive relief.
However, the Court declined to offer such relief.
10).

(Opinion p.

The Court was apparently impressed that the purpose of

such injunctive relief would not be met and that, even if it
were, Kasco would realize no benefit:
Although there is ample legal authority to
grant prospective injunctive relief, we hold
that such relief would be of little or no
value to Kasco in the instant case. The
main purpose of an injunction is to preserve
the status quo. That purpose was defeated
by the trial court' s refusal to grant
injunctive relief against Connie, Robert,
and Tri-B-Supply early on. They were able
to do for Larry Benson what he could not do
for himself, i. e. , solicit Kasco' s customers
to become customers of Tri-B-Supply.
Although this court enjoined Larry, Connie,
Robert, and Tri-B-Supply from further
soliciting or accepting business from Kasco
customers pending determination of this
appeal, by that time (August 14, 1990),
nearly eighteen months had expired since
Benson terminated employment with Kasco.
Connie and Robert had been free during all
of that time to erode Kasco' s customer base.
Since it appears unlikely that any benefit
would now accrue to Kasco by extending the
injunction for another six months, we
decline to do so.
(Opinion p. 10).
•4-
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The Court implies that where the status quo
(presumably as it was before any or many customers are lost to
the breaching former employee) is not preserved early on,
prospective injunctive relief will not be available.
p.

(Opinion

10). If this were the rule, however, the equitable remedy of

prospective injunctive relief would not be available at all.
This is so because only when deserved injunctive relief is
initially refused (as the trial court refused it here) will the
aggrieved party, in any context, subsequently seek prospective
injunctive relief.

By the time the right to the initial

injunction is acknowledged on appeal, things will seldom be as
they were before the breach.
Thus, if prospective injunctive relief is made
contingent upon preservation of the status quo, such relief
becomes illusory.
11

The result is to allow the breaching party

to reap the profits of his breach [and] also to render the

judicial system impotent to redress it, simply by forcing the
other party to go through lengthy litigation to obtain relief. "
Roanoke Engineering Sales Co. . Inc. v. Rosenbaum. 22 3 Va. 54 8,
290 S. E. 2d 882, 886 (1982) (granting prospective injunctive
relief after breaching party had been allowed to compete
throughout the proceedings).
-5g \wpl\188\00001cnl W51

The continued survival and profitability of a business
that took years of hard work to secure should not be made to
depend on the status quo or the ability of a wrongdoer to delay
efforts of the business to protect itself.
B.

Whether Prospective Injunctive Relief Would
Benefit Kasco is a Question of Fact to be
RSfliaftflefl tQ the Trigul Cwrt

The second aspect of the Court' s holding on
prospective injunctive relief concerned the usefulness of such
relief.

If the Court does not reconsider its apparent holding

concerning when prospective injunctive relief is appropriate
(discussed above), the Court should remand this second issue for
findings by the trial court.
Whether Kasco will benefit from prospective injunctive
relief is apparently a question of fact.

The trial court made

no findings subject to review concerning this issue.

Nothing in

the record indicates that Kasco no longer has good will to
marshall, restore and preserve.
true.

Indeed, just the opposite is

The existence and value of Kasco' s good will is evidenced

in part by the number of Kasco customers Bensons have amassed
after misappropriating and exploiting Kasco' s good will that
Larry Benson nurtured as Kasco' s agent.

See Allen v. Rose Park

Pharmacy. 120 Utah 608, 237 P. 2d 823, 827 (1951) (an employer is
-6g:\wpl\188\00001cnl.W51

entitled to the good will created by his employee).

Finally,

nothing in the record indicates that further injunctive relief
would not benefit Kasco.

Thus, if this is a question of fact,

as it appears to be, the Court should remand the issue to the
trial court to make factual findings concerning whether "any
benefit would now accrue to Kasco" by prospectively enjoining
Bensons.
V.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, Kasco respectfully requests
that the Court reconsider its holding denying prospective
injunctive relief and that the Court prospectively enjoin
Bensons for at least six additional months. *

(Kasco' s opening

brief, p. 34).
DATED this 14th day of April, 1992.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY

Kasco Services Corporation
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333

Compare Orkin Exterminating Co. , Inc. v. Bailey. 550 So. 2d
563, 564-65 (Flo. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)(prospective injunction for
full contract period granted even though certain defendants
already had been temporarily enjoined).
-7g \wpl\188\00001cnl W51

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy
of the within and foregoing Petition for Rehearing to be mailed,
postage prepaid, this 14th day of April, 1992, to the following:
Reid Tateoka
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN
1200 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
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Tab A

This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
OOOOO
Kasco Services Corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

No. 900260
F I L E D
March 3 1 ,

v.

Larry D. Benson and Connie A.
Benson dba Tri-B-Supply,
Defendants and Appellees.

1992

Geoffrey J, Butler, Clerk

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable David S. Young
Attorneys:

HQWE,

Michael F. Richman, David L. Arrington, Salt Lake
City, for plaintiff
Reid Tateoka, Shawn D. Turner, Salt Lake City, for
defendants

Associate Chief Justice:

This interlocutory appeal arises out of an action
by Kasco Services Corporation against defendants Larry D.
Benson, his wife Connie A. Benson, and Tri-B-Supply for an
injunction and damages resulting from an alleged breach of a
covenant not to compete contained in an employment contract.
We granted this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-2(3)(j) and rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
In 1982, Larry Benson was employed by Keene
Corporation. They entered into an employment agreement which
contained a restrictive covenant that upon termination,
Benson would not compete for eighteen months. The agreement
specifically provided that Benson would not
(i) call upon any Keene Customer for
the purpose of soliciting, selling, renting
and/or servicing Butcher Products,
(ii) directly or indirectly, solicit,
divert, take away or attempt to take away
any Keene Customer, or the business or
patronage of any such customer for Butcher
Products, or

(iii) directly or indirectly, engage
in any manner in the business of the sale,
rental or servicing of Butcher Products in
any geographic territory in which [Larry
Benson] had called upon Keene Customers
during the period of his employment with
Keene .
The agreement further prohibited Benson from using or
disclosing confidential information. He was given confidential
customer and pricing lists and was entrusted with preexisting
customers. The agreement expressly stated that the parties'
rights and obligations Hbind and inure to the benefit of any
successor or successors of Keene by • . . merger . . . ."
Kasco is a successor in interest to Keene, and the rights and
obligations of Keene were assigned to Kasco.
In the summer of 1988, following the merger of Keene
with Kasco, employment contracts were sent to all employees
including Benson. The preexisting agreements with Keene were
"restated for the record." Benson refused to sign the 1988
contract and alleges that he informed Kasco in August 1988
that he considered the noncompetition covenants "null and
void.w He- continued, however, to work for Kasco and on
February 15, 1989, provided written notice that he would
resign effective March 1, 1989.
Benson was one of Kasco's top five salespersons.
Kasco's customers developed a pleasant, ongoing relationship
with him. In effect, Benson was Kasco in his territory, and
he was responsible for the goodwill of the business because he
was the only sales representative in his territory.
We have previously held that "'a covenant not to
compete is necessary for the protection of the goodwill of the
business when it is shown that although the employee learns no
trade secrets, he may likely draw away customers from his
former employer, if he were permitted to compete nearby.'*
System Concepts. Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 426 (Utah 1983)
(quoting Allen y« Rose Park Pharmacy/ 120 Utah 2d 608, 617,
237 P.2d «23, 827-28 (1951)).

J

partly after terminating employment with Kasco,
pm a butcher supply business with his wife Connie,
competition with Kasco. The business was called
Tri-B-Supply, and they employed their son Robert. When Kasco
became aware of this, it brought this action for damages and
sought a preliminary injunction. The trial judge granted the
injunction against Larry Benson, finding that the four
requirements set forth in Allen v. Rose Park Pharmacy. 120
Utah 2d at 619, 237 P.2d at 828, had been satisfied.1
1. The four requirements are that (1) the covenant not to
compete must be supported by consideration; (2) no bad faith
(Continued on page 3.)

Moreover, the court determined that Kasco had also met the
requirements of Rpfrftins v. Fin1?yr 645 P.2d 623, 627-28 (Utah
1982), which held that not only must the restrictive covenant
be necessary to protect the goodwill of the business, but also
the employer must show that the services rendered by the
employee are special, unique, or extraordinary.2
The trial judge determined that the eighteen-month
time period specified in the covenant began to run in August
1988, when Benson refused to sign the new employment contract
and allegedly told Kasco that he would not abide by the
noncompetition covenant. The judge refused to enjoin Connie
and later denied Kasco's motion to amend its complaint to add
Robert as a defendant. We granted an interlocutory appeal to
review these rulings. During the pendency of this appeal, we
enjoined Larry, Connie, and Robert Benson, along with
Tri-B-Supply, from further soliciting or accepting business
from Kasco's customers. The assertion in the dissenting
opinion that Kasco did not timely petition for an
interlocutory appeal is without merit. The April 10, 1989
order granting a preliminary injunction was not a final order,
but an interlocutory order, which by its very nature was
subject to modification. Sfifi Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). In 1990,
Kasco sought to modify the April 10, 1989 order. This appeal
was timely taken from the court's refusal to do so.
TIME FRAME OF THE COVENANT
Kasco contends that the trial court erred in holding
that the eighteen months began to run in August 1988 rather
(Footnote 1 continued.)
may be shown in the negotiation of the contract; (3) the
covenant must be necessary to protect the goodwill of the
business; and (4) the covenant must be reasonable in its
restrictions in terms of time and geographic area. Allen v.
Rose Park Pharmacy, 120 Utah 2d at 619, 237 P.2d at 828.
2. Although Benson has not cross-appealed and made an issue
of whether the requirements of Robbins v. Finlay were met, the
dissenting opinion raises the question and determines that
they were not met because Benson was "a route salesman, pure
and simple." We disagree with that characterization because
Finlay was a salesman who was free to sell similar products of
competing manufacturers and did not return to service the
products he sold. On the other hand, Benson was trained by
Kasco to service and repair grinders, saws, slicers, and
tenderizers manufactured and sold only by Kasco. He was
entrusted with Kasco's preexisting customers and given
confidential customer and pricing lists. He was given an
exclusive territory to service Kasco's products and every four
months called on each of Kasco's customers. Benson was like
the pharmacist in Rose Park Pharmacy, where all the goodwill
of the employer was associated with and created by the
employee.
3
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than when Benson actually resigned on March 1, 1989.
trial judge reasoned:

The

The preliminary injunction will be
granted to expire 18 months from August,
i988 because I believe at that time the
company was on notice that Mr. Benson did
not wish to retain any restrictive
covenants in his employment, thereafter,
the company would be willing to either —
required to terminate him or deal otherwise
with him. At that point the restrictive
covenant would be terminated as to its
application to Mr. Benson except for 18
months thereafter.
(Emphasis added.)
The trial judge made no specific findings of fact or
conclusions of law. The covenant not to compete expressly
states that the eighteen-month time frame begins to run after
termination. The trial court's finding that Kasco was Hon
notice" and the noncompetition covenant began to run in
August 1988 involves a question of fact and a question of
law. Since the finding that Kasco was on notice was a
question of fact, we reverse only if we find it clearly
erroneous. See Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); State v. Petersen, 810
P. 2d 421, 425 (Utah 1991). However, the effect of that
notice, which presumably led the trial court to find an
anticipatory repudiation/ is a question of law which we
review for correctness. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774,
781-82 n.3 (Utah 1991); State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d at 425.
An anticipatory breach occurs when a party to an
executory contract manifests a positive and unequivocal
intent not to render performance when the time fixed for
performance is due. Hurwitz v. David K. Richards Co.. 20
Utah 2d 232, 234-35, 436 P.2d 794, 796 (1968). The other
party can immediately treat the anticipatory repudiation as a
breach, or it can continue to treat the contract as operable
and urge performance without waiving any right to sue for
that repudiation. United California Bank v, Prudential Inst
fn, of jfcBTIXirn 140 Ariz. 238, 281, 681 P.2d 390, 433 (Ct.
App. I9ff3); see also University Club v, Invesco Holding
Corp., 29 Utah 2d 1, 3, 504 P.2d 29, 39 (1972).
Our court of appeals recently noted, "A party that
has received a definite repudiation from the breaching party
to the contract should not be penalized for its efforts to
encourage the breaching party to perform its end of the
bargain." Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 716, 725
(Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citing United California Bank. 140
Ariz, at 281, 681 P.2d at 433); see also 4 Arthur L. Corbin,
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forhin on Contracts § 981 (1951). The opinion fully
explains the "modern rule" of anticipatory breach and the
outmoded common law "waiver" theory.
We need not decide here whether Benson's
announcement that he did not intend to abide by the
noncompetition covenant was an anticipatory repudiation. It
makes no difference in this case. If his remarks were an
anticipatory repudiation, Kasco simply had an election. It
could treat the remark as a breach, or it could continue to
treat the contract as operable and encourage performance
without waiving any rights under the contract. If there was
no anticipatory repudiation, the noncompetition covenant
remained in full force. Therefore, anticipatory repudiation
or not, it was error for the trial court to rule that the
eighteen months began to run when Kasco was put on notice of
Benson's intent not to comply with the restrictive covenant.
The beginning time should have been the actual date of
Benson's resignation.
POWER TO ENJOIN DOES NOT REQUIRE PRIVITY
Kasco contends that the trial court erred by not
enjoining Connie Benson. The refusal was because she was not
in privity of contract with Kasco. The court believed that a
direct contract was a prerequisite to injunctive relief:
JUDGE YOUNG: . . . and you [Kasco]
fundamentally have no right to enforce
anything as to Mrs. Benson in relation to
this agreement. . . .

MR. RICHMAN: I would assume that this
court's order is not precluding us from
seeking a permanent injunction against
Mrs. Benson at a later time, just a denial
at this time.
JUDGE YOUNG: Well, I don't see that I
have any basis for having jurisdiction
over her in relation to a contract at all.
We have previously held:
[T]he granting or refusing of injunction
rests to some extent within the sound
discretion of the trial court, and its
judgment . . .will not be disturbed on
appeal unless it can be said the court
abused its discretion, or that the judgment

s

No

Qnn?fin

rendered is clearly against the weight of
the evidence.
System Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon. 669 P.2d at 425 (quoting
Johnson v. Ward, 541 P.2d 182, 188 (Okla. 1975)). The trial
court's discretion must be exercised consistent with sound
equitable principles, "taking into account all the facts and
circumstances of the case." Id.
Connie Benson is a stranger to the agreement between
Kasco and Larry Benson. This court has not previously decided
whether persons lacking privity may be enjoined. An Indiana
decision holds that "the rule that a stranger to a covenant
may be enjoined from aiding and assisting the covenanter in
violating his covenant is supported by an overwhelming weight
of authority." West Shore Restaurant Corp. v. Turk, 101 So.
2d 123, 129 (Fla. 1958), quoted in McCart v. H&R Block, Inc..
470 N.E.2d 756, 760 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984); see also Chemical
Fireproofina Corp. v. Bronska, 542 S.W.2d 74, 80 (Mo. Ct. App.
1976) (nonsigning spouse can be enjoined if "under the
circumstances it is reasonable to enjoin a stranger to a
covenant from aiding and assisting the covenantor in violating
his contract or receiving any benefits therefrom"); Arwell

Division of Orkin Exterminating CQt v, Kendrick, 131 ill. App.
2d 632, 633, 267 N.E.2d 352, 354 (1971); Madison v. LaSene, 44
Wash. 2d 546, 559, 268 P.2d 1006, 1013 (1954); Ingredient
Technology Corp. v. Nay* 532 F. Supp. 627, 631 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
More recently/ the Nevada Supreme Court followed the
reasoning of McCart that the "better, and, apparently,
majority view allows a party not privy to a covenant not to
compete to be enjoined, if that party breaches the covenant in
active concert with the principal party enjoined and with
knowledge of the covenant." Las Vegas Novelty, Inc. v.
Fernandez, 787 P.2d 772, 774 (Nev. 1990). The court found
support for its ruling in Nevada's injunction rule, which is
substantially the same as our rule on injunctions, Utah Rule
of Civil Procedure 65A(d). Our rule provides:
Every order granting an injunction and
every restraining order . . . is binding
only upon the parties to the action, their
officers, agents, servants, employees, and
attorneys, and upon those persons in active
concert or participation with them who
receive actual notice of the order by
personal service or otherwise.
Utah R. Civ. P. 65A(d) (emphasis added).3
3. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65A has been substantially
revised effective September 1, 1991. See Utah R. Civ. P. 65A
(Continued on page 7.)
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The Nevada court further added: "NRCP 65(d) is not
precisely on point, because it addresses the scope of
enforcement of an injunction after the injunction has been
properly issued. Nevertheless, this section makes no mention
of a privity requirement and provides significant support for
the majority view." Las Vegas Novelty, Inc. v. Fernandez,
787 P.2d at 774.
We find the Nevada court's analysis to be equally
applicable in our jurisdiction and therefore adopt its
position that in the appropriate circumstances, a third party
may be enjoined if it is shown to be aiding or assisting the
covenantor in violating the noncompetition agreement and with
knowledge of the covenant.
In the instant case, evidence was presented that
Connie Benson was in fact aiding or assisting her husband in
violating the noncompetition agreement. Ten days after
Benson's resignation, a letter on Tri-B-Supply letterhead was
sent to potential customers, many of which were Kasco
customers. The letter read in part:
Dear friend,
We would like to inform you that we
have started our own business . . . .
We will be contacting you soon in
hopes to supply you with your service
needs.
We will be operating our [routes] on
a 3 month service program in order to give
you more frequent service and to provide
for your needs in a more efficient manner.
Because of decreased over head costs
we will be able to provide less expensive
service in the future . . . .
Thank you for your support in the
past and look forward to serving you in
the future.
Sincerely,
Connie A. Benson, President
Larry D. Benson, Service Rep.
(Footnote 3 continued.)
(Supp. Aug. 1991); see alSQ Mark W. Dykes, Injunctions Under
Revised Rule of Civil Procedure 65A, Utah B.J., Aug.-Sept.
1991, at 17.

7
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It is clear that there was concerted action from the
very beginning by Larry and Connie Benson. Her conduct is a
good example of aiding or assisting a covenantor in violating
a restrictive covenant and with knowledge of the covenant•
Therefore, we conclude that it was error not to enjoin Connie
Benson.
Soon after the trial court enjoined Larry Benson but
refused to enjoin his wife, another letter was sent to former
Kasco customers who had recently become customers of
Tri-B-Supply. This letter states in part:
This is to inform you that Larry
Benson has a Restraining Order against him
and cannot service in the area for the
period of 1 year.
However I would like to inform you
that I am operating with my son Robert L.
Benson, who is very capable of handling
your service needs to operate our new
business . . . .
Sincerely,
Connie A. Benson
Robert L. Benson
The letter also mentioned that Robert had received training in
the service and repair of grinders, saws, slicers, and
tenderizers. Again, there is evidence of concerted action.
Had the trial court granted Kasco's motion to add Robert as a
defendant, Kasco may have been able to adduce sufficient
evidence of concerted action for which an injunction would lie
against him.
PROSPECTIVE INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Kasco next contends that it is entitled to
prospective injunctive relief for another six months because
it was not given full opportunity to restore its goodwill.
Benson was enjoined for only twelve months, and Connie and
Robert were not enjoined at all. Benson asserts that the
issue is moot because the eighteen-month period expired during
the pendency of this appeal.
Some state courts have held that a request for an
injunction is moot when the underlying agreement has expired
by its own terms. See Professional Business Servs.. Inc. v.
Gustafson, 285 Or. 307, 310, 590 P.2d 729, 730 (1979).
Similarly, the Washington Court of Appeals has held that
injunctive relief is "inappropriate and manifestly unfair"
when the restrictive covenants have expired by their own
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terms. Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. Wohlmanf 19 Wash. App.
670, 688, 578 P.2d 530, 540 (1978). The court concluded that
money damages would be the appropriate remedy. id.
The Seventh Circuit is in accord with the above cases
in their holdings of mootness. However, their reasoning is
based upon constitutional grounds:
Because this appeal was heard more than
eleven weeks after the end-date of the
injunction, we raised the threshold issue
of mootness. Article III of the
Constitution requires that federal courts
only decide disputes that present a "Case
or Controversy." Because the preliminary
injunction Brown appealed from expired
under its own terms, the issues decided by
the trial court pertaining to the propriety
of a preliminary injunction have "lost
. . . [their] character as a present, live
controversy of the kind that must exist if
we are to avoid advisory opinions on
abstract propositions of law."
Henco. Inc. v. Brown, 904 F.2d 11, 13 (7th Cir. 1990)
(quoting Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 48, 90 S. Ct. 200,
201-02, 24 L. Ed. 2d 214, 218 (1969)).
The Tenth Circuit has held that under their plenary
power and an inherent power to do equity, prospective
injunctive relief may be appropriate. Kodekey Electronics,
Inc. v. Mechanex Corp., 500 F.2d 110, 112-13 (10th Cir.
1974). The Kodekev court further added that if prospective
relief were not granted, the employer would "in effect be
deprived of the benefit of the non-competition agreement
because of the stays sought . . . and granted to postpone the
effect of the original injunction." Id. at 112.
However, the Supreme Court of Virginia enjoined a
former employee of a corporation under a noncompetition
agreement for the time specified even though the time period
in the covenant had run, because the employee had
successfully opposed the injunction. Roanoke Ena'a Sales Co.
v. Rosenbaum. 290 S.E.2d 882, 886 (Va. 1982). Similarly, in
a Florida case, an injunction under a noncompetition
agreement was held to run from the order date following
remand, not from the date of termination, because the trial
court did not provide the full period of injunction. Orkin
Exterminating Co. v. Bailey, 550 So. 2d 563, 564-65 (Fla. Ct.
App. 1989).
A finding of mootness would in effect reward the
breach of the noncompetition covenant, "encourage protracted
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litigation, and provide an incentive to dilatory tactics."
Rosenbaum, 290 S.E.2d at 886. Moreover, this would also
"render the judicial process impotent to redress" the reward
for a breach, "simply by forcing the other party to go
through lengthy litigation to obtain relief," Jjj.
Although there is ample legal authority to grant
prospective injunctive relief, we hold that such relief would
be of little or no value to Kasco in the instant case. The
main purpose of an injunction is to preserve the status quo.
That purpose was defeated by the trial court's refusal to
grant injunctive relief against Connie, Robert, and
Tri-B-Supply early on. They were able to do for Larry Benson
what he could not do for himself, :.e., solicit Kasco's
customers to become customers of Tri-B-Supply. Although this
court enjoined Larry, Connie, Robert, and Tri-B-Supply from
further soliciting or accepting business from Kasco customers
pending determination of this appeal, by that time (August
14, 1990), nearly eighteen months had expired since Benson
terminated employment with Kasco. Connie and Robert had been
free during all of that time to erode Kasco's customer base.
Since it appears unlikely that any benefit would now accrue
to Kasco by extending the injunction for another six months,
we decline to do so. Kasco's damage claim is pending in the
trial court. Damages can now be determined with reasonable
certainty at this point in the litigation. Therefore,
Kasco's claim for prospective injunctive relief is denied.
LEAVE TO AMEND COMPLAINT
Finally, Kasco seeks relief from the trial court's
denial of leave to amend its complaint to add Robert as a
defendant and to assert claims against him and additional
claims against Larry and Connie Benson. The standard of
review of a denial to amend pleadings is abuse of
discretion. Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 211, 381 P.2d
86, 91 (1963). Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure states in part that leave to amend "shall be freely
given when justice so requires." We have held, "A primary
consideration that a trial judge must take into account in
determining whether leave should be granted is whether the
opposing side would be put to unavoidable prejudice by having
an issue adjudicated for which he had not had time to
prepare.* Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455, 464
(Utah 1983).
The record does not disclose why leave to amend was
not granted. Defendants advance no argument that they would
be prejudiced by the addition of issues. It may have been
that the trial court thought Robert could not be enjoined
because privity of contract was lacking. However, we have
held earlier in this opinion that in proper instances,
privity is not necessary for injunctive relief. Defendants
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now suggest that the amendments sought were properly denied
because they were futile and offered in bad faith. See
Christiansen v. Utah Transit Auth.. 649 P.2d 42, 47 (Utah
1982). We cannot say that Kasco's attempt to seek relief
against Robert was futile. Likewise, we find no indication
of bad faith. We thus conclude that it was an abuse of
discretion to deny Kasco's motion to amend.
The case is remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. The injunction
heretofore entered by this court is dissolved.

WE CONCUR:

Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice

Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice

STEWART. Justice:

(Dissenting)

I dissent. First, Kasco's appeal was untimely, and
this Court is without jurisdiction. Second, this appeal is
moot because the eighteen-month injunction period has long
ago expired, even from the time of Benson's termination of
employment and under the most liberal policy for extending
that period. Third, assuming that the merits of the appeal
are properly before the Court, I submit that the majority
errs in ruling that the trial court made adequate findings
under Robbins v. Finlav, 645 P.2d 623 (Utah 1982), in support
of the injunction. In any event, the requirements of Finlay
were not met. In my view, the majority opinion eviscerates
Finlay and, in effect, allows noncompetition agreements to be
enforced in virtually any case involving salespersons
competinf against former employers.
I
We granted Kasco's petition for an interlocutory
appeal pursuant to Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure. Under that rule, a petition for an interlocutory
appeal must be filed within twenty days from the entry of the
order appealed from. Kasco filed its petition for
interlocutory appeal from the trial court's denial on May 9,
1990, of Kasco's motion to modify a preliminary injunction.
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The preliminary injunction had been entered previously on
April 10/ 1989. The petition for interlocutory appeal was
filed May 29, 1990, within twenty days of the denial of the
motion to modify, but over one year after the entry of the
injunction. The timeliness of the petition for interlocutory
appeal turns on whether the petition should have been filed
within twenty days of the entry of the injunction or within
twenty days of the denial of the motion to modify.
One of Kasco's contentions on the merits of this
appeal is that the trial court erred in ruling that the
eighteen-month injunction enforcing the noncompetition
covenant should have run from March 1, 1989, when Larry
Benson was terminated, not from August 1988 when, arguably,
there was an anticipatory breach of the covenant by Benson.
That, however, was one of the issues the trial court
adjudicated on April 10, 1989, when the injunction was first
entered. Kasco failed to file a petition for interlocutory
appeal within twenty days of that order. Instead, it waited
for nearly a year to file its motion to modify the
preliminary injunction in which it reargued the exact issue,
together with other issues unrelated to this basic issue.
When Kasco lost, it petitioned for interlocutory review of
the denial of the motion to modify. But re-raising the issue
of when the injunction should begin to run was not really a
modification issue all, as the majority blithely assumes.
That issue had been ruled on when the injunction was issued.
Kasco's strategy should not be allowed to succeed.
Motions to reconsider cannot extend the time for filing an
appeal, Peay v. Peay. 607 P.2d 841, 843 (Utah 1980), unless
they can be deemed motions for a new trial, Watkiss &
Campbell v. FQA & Son, 808 P.2d 1061, 1064-65 (Utah 1991).
In considering the motion to modify, the trial court did not
treat it as a motion for a new trial.
Even if Kasco's motion could be deemed a motion for
new trial, it was not filed within ten days of the trial
court's order as required by Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e). Nor was it the equivalent of any other
motion that might extend the time for filing a notice of
appeal. §ft£ Utah R. App. P. 4(b); Watkiss & Campbell. 808
P.2d at » 6 5 & n.ll.
'Kasco asserts that its petition was timely filed
because a trial court has the prerogative, either on its own
motion or on application of a party, to correct an order at
any time if entered by "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect, as provided by Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P," and
cites as support Rees v. Albertson's, Inc., 587 P.2d 130
(Utah 1978). However, Kasco has never contended that it
filed a motion under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
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Procedure, and, in any event, the motion to modify was not
filed within three months of entry of the order, as required
by Rule 60(b)(7).
Kasco also argues that because this Court granted
the petition for an interlocutory appeal, the jurisdictional
issue must be deemed to have been decided- That is not the
case. Petitions for interlocutory appeal are disposed of on
the papers in a summary fashion. The jurisdictional
question, although referred to in those papers, has not
heretofore been squarely presented- It is now properly
before the Court.
The majority simply concludes that because a
preliminary injunction Hby its very nature" is subject to
modification, Kasco's appeal from denial of its motion to
modify is timely. Supra at 3- The unfortunate result of the
majority's position is that a party may now use a motion to
modify an injunction as a means to extend indefinitely the
time to file an out-of-time petition for interlocutory appeal
of the grant of a motion for a preliminary injunction and
thereby subvert the time limitation in Rule 5 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.1
II
On the merits, the majority holds that Kasco is
entitled to an injunction against Larry D. Benson, his wife
Connie A. Benson, and their son Robert Benson and that under
Larry Benson's employment contract, the eighteen-month
noncompetition injunction should run from the date Benson
terminated his employment, rather than from the date that
Kasco was put on notice of Benson's intent not to comply with
the covenant not to compete.
To obtain injunctive relief under Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 65A(e), the movant must by argument and evidence
convince the trial court that the requirements have been
met. System Concepts. Inc. v. Dixon. 669 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah
1983). When the instant case was adjudicated, Rule 65A(e)
provided that an injunction may be granted on the following
bases:
(1) when it appears by the pleading on
file that a party is entitled to the
relief demanded, and such relief, or any
part thereof, consists in restraining the
1. Clearly, the terms of an injunction may be modified after
it goes into effect. However, the law is that a movant must
first show some change in circumstances. Kasco has not
alleged any changed circumstances that bear upon the issue of
when the injunction should have commenced.
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commission or continuance of some act
complained of, either for a limited period
or perpetually;
(2) when it appears from the pleadings
or by affidavit that the commission or
continuance of some act during the
litigation would produce great or
irreparable injury to the party seeking
injunctive relief;
(3) when it appears during the
litigation that either party is doing or
threatens, or is about to do, or is
procuring or suffering to be done, some
act in violation of the rights of another
party respecting the subject matter of the
action, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual;
(4) in all other cases where an
injunction would be proper in equity.
Thus, Kasco had to show that it was entitled to the relief it
demanded.
Speaking to the validity of the trial court's
determination that an injunction was warranted, the majority
holds that all the requirements for issuing the injunction
were met. That simply is not the case. The majority ignores
a fundamental and blatantly obvious defect in the trial
court's findings. The majority asserts that "the [trial]
court determined that Kasco had also met the requirements of
Robbins v, Finlav. 645 P.2d 623, 627-28 (Utah 1982) . . . ."
Supra at 2-3. The majority is flatly wrong.
In a general discussion of relevant legal
principles, the trial court did refer to Finlay. In making
its findings in support of the injunction, however, the trial
court made no findings whatsoever pertaining to the standards
established in Finlay. The trial court simply found that the
covenant not to compete was enforceable as a matter of
black-lifter contract law, that the covenant was necessary to
protect fch« goodwill of the business, and that the
restrictions of the covenant were reasonable as to time and
area:
They being number one, that the covenant
must be supported by consideration. That
requirement is met.
Number two, that no bad faith be shown in
the negotiations of the contract. I
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believe, likewise, even though some did
not wish to sign the contract under the
circumstances of its presentation, that
requirement also was met.
Number three, the covenant be necessary to
protect the goodwill of the business and,
number four, that it be reasonable in its
restrictions in terms of time and area. I
believe each of those requirements is met
in this contract and thus the preliminary
injunction will be granted.
The injunction was patently unlawful on the face of this record
because the trial court failed to make the essential finding
under Finlay that Benson was not engaged in a common calling
and that Kasco had a legally protectible interest. Before I
discuss Finlay, however, a second point must be made.
The majority opinion states, "We have previously held
that '"a covenant not to compete is necessary for the
protection of the goodwill of the business when it is shown
that although the employee learns no trade secrets, he may
likely draw away customers from his former employer, if he were
permitted to compete nearby.W,H Supra at 2 (quoting System
Concepts. Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 426 (Utah 1983) (quoting

Allen v. Rose Park Pharmacy, 120 Utah 2d 608, 617, 237 p.2d
823, 827-28 (1951))). The majority's quotation from Rose Park
is overly selective and ignores the subsequent modification of
the 1951 Rose Park holding. Indeed, in the very next paragraph
in System Concepts, this Court stated:
Under the Rose Park reasoning, this
goodwill alone would be considered a
protectible interest which SCI could
justifiably secure through a restrictive
covenant. More recently, however, this
Court has held that to justify enforcement
of a restrictive employment covenant by
injunctive relief the employer must show
not only goodwill, but that the services
rendered by the employee were special/
unique or extraordinary.
669 P.2d at 426 (citing Robbins v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623, 627-28
(Utah 1982)). In truth, the covenant in the instant case does
nothing more than baldly restrain competition, which it may not
do. £££ Columbia Ribbon & Carbon Mfg. Co. v. A-l-A Corp.. 369
N.E.2d 4, 6 (N.Y. 1977). The point the majority misses is that
any competition with a former employer will always have an
effect upon that employer's goodwill, if goodwill is defined in
terms of gross sales. On that view, all covenants not to
compete seek to protect an employer's goodwill, no matter how

common the calling in which the employee is
majority's rule, therefore, virtually every
compete is enforceable, irrespective of how
restriction is on the employee's freedom to

engaged. Under the
covenant not to
oppressive the
contract and work.

Robbins v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623 (Utah 1982),
constituted a major modification of the rule laid down in Rose
Park.2 Finlay recognized that employees who engage in common
callings have property interests in their labor and the right
to pursue a chosen occupation for the benefit of themselves and
their dependents. Such employees necessarily learn some
aspects of their employer's business which would enable them to
compete in selling products or services of the type sold by the
employer. An employee's acquisition of general knowledge or
expertise and its use on behalf of a competitor after the
employee leaves the first employer, however, does not represent
unfair, unethical, or improper conduct. Indeed, the
acquisition of knowledge and ability is the natural and
inevitable by-product of pursuing one's chosen occupation. It
may be that an employee first learns an occupation by
performing the duties of his employment. But even that does
not vest the employer with any interest in the employee's
knowledge, labor, or expertise. This has long been the
protection the common law has accorded individuals engaged in
common callings. It would be highly exploitive of persons
engaged in common callings, such as salespersons, to allow an
employer to restrain them from earning a livelihood simply
because, in some degree or another, the goodwill of the
employer tends to rub off onto employees or because some degree
of employer goodwill was created by the employees in the course
of discharging their duties. The law does not allow that.
Finlay, 645 P.2d at 627.
Thus, Finlay stands for the proposition that employers
may not use covenants not to compete to prevent competition
from former employees who engaged in common callings, such as
selling, even if the employee can compete more effectively
because of their employment. See also Reed, Roberts ASSOCS,,

ingf vy Stravroan, 353 N.E.2d 590 (N.Y. 1976); Ames Distributing
Co. v. Mascari, 724 P.2d 596 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
The right to earn a living by engaging in a common
calling is a fundamental right which the law must jealously
protect. In Finlay, on facts somewhat similar to the instant
case, we stated:
The record shows that Finlay's job
required little training and is not unlike
the job of many other types of salesmen.
2. In Rose Park, the employee enjoined was a professional
person solely responsible for building the business of a small
neighborhood pharmacy.

The company's investment in training him
was small. In fact, he had previously
worked as a Beltone salesman for other
dealers in Canada. Furthermore, there is
no showing that his services were special,
unique, or extraordinary, even if their
value to his employer was high. Thus,
this case is similar to Columbia Ribbon &
Carbon Mfg. Co. v. A-l-A Corp., 42 N.Y.2d
496, 398 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 369 N.E.2d 4
(1977) where the court stated:
It is clear that [the covenant's]
broad-sweeping language is
unrestrained by any limitations keyed
to uniqueness [of the employee's
services], trade secrets,
confidentiality or even competitive
unfairness. It does no more than
badly restrain competition. This it
may not do. fid., 398 N.Y.S.2d at
1006, 369 N.E.2d at 6.]
It is of no moment that defendant may
have been especially proficient in his
work. General knowledge or expertise
acquired through employment in a common
calling cannot be appropriated as a trade
secret. "The efficiency and skills which
an employee develops through his work
belong to him and not to his former
employer." Hallmark Personnel of Texas,
Inc. v. Franks, Tex. Cr. App. 562 S.W.2d
933, 936 (1978). The same principles
apply to the covenant here. We hold that
the covenant not to compete had the effect
of preventing the defendant from
exploiting skills and experience which he
had a right to exploit.
Finlay, 645 P.2d at 628 (footnote omitted).
The trial court and the majority ignore the
fundamental policy on which Finlay rested. If the trial
court had correctly applied Finlay to the facts of this case,
Kasco could not have made the requisite showing under
Rule 65A(e)(l) that it was entitled to the relief demanded.
Finlay requires that before a trial court can conclude that a
covenant not to compete is enforceable, it must first
determine that the employee was not engaged in a common
calling and that the employer has a legally protectible
interest. Finlay, 645 P.2d at 627. A generalized assertion
that preventing the completion of a former employee will
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protect the employer's goodwill is not enough,
627-28; System Concepts, 669 P.2d at 426.

id. at

In this case, defendant Larry Benson was a salesman
of butcher supplies. He was a route salesman, pure and
simple. He covered a rural territory in Utah and Idaho. He
had no trade secrets. He was not involved in management. As
a result of his common calling, he necessarily knew both the
actual and potential customers for the goods he sold in the
communities of his territory. Customers of butcher supplies
in such areas are not hard to find; a scan of local telephone
books would quickly identify them. Finally, Kasco's
customers are not found on a secret customer list.
The majority does not even address the issue of
whether Benson was engaged in a common calling. It rests
solely on the specious rationale that in his territory,
Benson was Kasco. Route salespersons are commonly viewed in
their territories as representatives of their employers. But
that is no reason to hold them in semi-bondage to their
former employers when they change jobs. The majority notes
that Benson was one of Kasco's top five salespersons. The
law, however, does not protect only less able individuals.
The consequence of the majority's ruling is that a
noncompetition covenant may be enforced against any route
salesperson whenever it could be said that the employer may
lose some sales, i.e., "goodwill," if the former employee is
not restrained from competing. That, of course, can be said
with respect to all route salespersons, no matter how common
their callings.

Durham, Justice, concurs in the dissenting opinion
of Justice Stewart.
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